The Daily View: The price of passage — Hormuz’s future may come with a fee

INTERNATIONAL law does not allow any country, however powerful, to appoint itself guardian of the rights of all other states and charge for protection. Yet amid the outlandish headlines — from Washington floating transit tolls to Tehran demanding payment for passage — a more serious conversation is beginning to take shape around the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz.

Any Iranian attempt to impose unilateral tolls would have no legal basis and would set a dangerous precedent. Freedom of navigation cannot be contingent on Tehran’s permission or ability to collect revenue from international shipping. But while such ideas were dismissed outright only weeks ago, policymakers and industry figures are increasingly conceding that a post-conflict Hormuz may require a new framework — and that framework may involve some form of fee structure.

Greek shipowner Evangelos Marinakis was one of the first to articulate the argument publicly. Speaking during Posidonia in June, he suggested that vessels transiting Hormuz could pay a charge linked to maintaining safe passage through the waterway. The proposal initially appeared far-fetched. It now appears to be attracting more attention in policy circles than many assumed.

Marinakis’s argument is straightforward. Shipping already pays heavily for instability through war-risk premiums that can run from $1m-$3m per voyage. If a transparent and internationally accepted system could restore predictable navigation, the cost of a modest transit charge could be more than offset by lower insurance costs and reduced market disruption.

The economic logic is difficult to ignore. Oxford Economics estimates that a $1-per-barrel levy on oil moving through Hormuz could generate almost $7bn annually at pre-war volumes, exceeding the Suez Canal’s recent revenue. Even so, any future regime would need to be non-discriminatory, transparent and explicitly linked to services such as navigational safety, environmental protection and traffic management if it is to remain compatible with international law.

The broader point is that the debate has already moved beyond the binary question of whether Hormuz is open or closed. The old model no longer fits the corridor. What has emerged since the escalation of 2026 is neither blockade nor normalisation, but the early outlines of a new institutional framework governing one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints.

Whether that ultimately takes the form of joint Iran-Oman oversight, a broader Middle East Gulf-led arrangement or another mechanism altogether remains unclear. What is increasingly evident, however, is that a sustainable post-conflict settlement will require more than naval deterrence and temporary ceasefires.

The risk calculus in Hormuz is no longer defined solely by the threat of closure. It is increasingly shaped by the rules, obligations and governance structures being assembled around the waterway. The future of Hormuz may not depend on who controls the strait, but on who writes the rulebook.

Richard Meade
Editor-in-chief, Lloyd’s List